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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME V FALL, 1951 NUMBER 4
THREE NEW RULES OF EVIDENCE
Roy R. Ray*
3 HE lawyers of Texas owe a debt of gratitude to the Fifty-
second Legislature for its enactment of three statutes which
will do much to simplify the rules relating to proof of business
and official records and to provide a solution for what has been
an almost insoluble problem in cases where two persons perished
in a common disaster. These statutes are: The Business Records
Act,' the Official Records Act,2 and the Simultaneous Death Act.'
The statutes were drafted by the Texas Committee for the Improve-
ment of the Law of Evidence, a voluntary organization composed
of Texas lawyers, judges, and teachers of Evidence. The members
of this Committee,4 which was organized in May, 1950, having no
motive other than the improvement of our rules of evidence, were
the sole sponsors of these statutes. They acknowledge the fine sup-
port received from the members of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee and the Senate Civil Jurisprudence Committee. Without their
understanding and active assistance it would have been impossible
to secure the passage of these acts during the last and extremely
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busy days of the Session. Special thanks are due Senators Kyle
Vick of Waco and George Nokes of Corsicana, and Representa-
tives Morris Cobb of Amarillo and Jim Sewall of Blooming Grove,
who introduced the bills and pushed them in their respective com-
mittees. All attorneys, and especially trial lawyers, should fa-
miliarize themselves with the provisions of these new rules. With
this thought in mind, I have considered it worthwhile to set forth
below the text of each statute with some pertinent comments as to
its need, its source, and its objectives.
THE BUSINESS REcoRDs ACT
This Act, which carries the title "Business Records-Admission
as Evidence," was Senate Bill No. 288, and was enacted as Chap-
ter 321 of the Laws of 1951, 52nd Legislature. It becomes Article
37 37e of Vernon's Texas Revised Civil Statutes. The text is as
follows:
"Section 1. A memorandum or record of an act, event or condition
shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence of the occurrence of
the act or event or the existence of the condition if the judge finds that:
(a) It was made in the regular course of business;
(b) It was the regular course of that business for an employee or
representative of such business with personal knowledge of such
act, event or condition to make such memorandum or record
or to transmit information thereof to be included in such mem-
orandum or record;
(c) It was made at or near the time of the act, event or condition
or reasonably soon thereafter."
"Sec. 2. The identity and mode of preparation of the memorandum
or record in accordance with the provisions of paragraph one (1) may
be proved by the testimony of the entrant, custodian or other qualified
witness even though he may not have personal knowledge as to the vari-
ous items or contents of such memorandum or record. Such lack of per-
sonal knowledge may be shown to affect the weight and credibility of
the memorandum or record but shall not affect its admissibility.
"Sec. 3. Evidence to the effect that the records of a business do not
contain any memorandum or record of an alleged act, event or condi-
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tion shall be competent to prove the non-occurrence of the act or event
or the non-existence of the condition in that business if the judge finds
that it was the regular course of that business to make such memoranda
or records of all such acts, events or conditions at the time or within
reasonable time thereafter and to preserve them.
"Sec. 4. 'Business' as used in this Act includes any and every kind of
regular organized activity whether conducted for profit or not."
The chief problem in the proof of business records has been
that of authentication. It is obvious that the entries do not prove
themselves and should not be admitted in the absence of some
preliminary showing as to what the books and entries are and
under what circumstances they were kept. It is here that our courts,
as well as most other state courts, have been unnecessarily strict
and have failed to keep pace with modern business development.
Our courts and most others (in the absence of statutory change)
have continued the old common law requirement that the person
who made the entry and the person upon whose information it
was based be produced as witnesses or shown to be unavailable
by reason of death or other cause. Today business entries are
usually kept on loose-leaf sheets or cards and are typewritten
rather than in longhand. They are made upon information fur-
nished from many sources. It is frequently impossible to identify
the person who made the entry or who reported the information
upon which it was based. The maker of the final entry usually has
no personal knowledge of the transaction recorded. And even if
the persons who reported the information and who recorded it
could be identified and produced, they would almost inevitably
have no recollection about the particular transaction, and their
testimony would invariably be merely a statement to the effect
that they correctly reported and recorded the matter in question.
The rigid common law requirements served no useful purpose
and actually tended to prevent or discourage proof of just claims.
Under the new Act all that is required is proof by any qualified
witness that the entry was made in the regular course of business
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as a part of the record of some establishment, and near enough
to the time of the act recorded to have been fresh in the memory
of those participating in the transaction. All other matters, includ-
ing lack of personal knowledge, non-production of entrants and
reporters, may be shown only for the purpose of affecting the
weight to be given to the entry. Furthermore, the Act provides for
a circumstantial method of proving the non-occurrence of an Act
or event or the non-existence of a condition, namely, by showing
that the records of the business do not contain any memorandum
or record of such act, event or condition.
The movement for improvement in this field, which began ap-
proximately twenty-five years ago with the model statute recom.
mended by the Committee of the Commonwealth Fund, has finally
reached Texas. Three states and the Federal Congress adopted
that statute. In 1936 the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws approved a Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act. This statute with modifications has been adopted in
some sixteen states. Our Act has been based in part on these two
model statutes and in part on Rule 514 of the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Evidence. It is believed, however, that
the provisions of the Texas Act are more definite and not quite as
broad as those of the Uniform Act.
THE OFFIcIAL REcoRDs ACT
This Act, which carries the title "Records-Admission as Evi-
dence," was Senate Bill No. 289 and was enacted as Chapter 471
of the Laws of 1951, 52nd Legislature. It becomes Article 3731a
of Vernon's Texas Revised Civil Statutes. The text is as follows:
"Section 1. Any written statement, certificate, record, return or
report made by an officer of this state or of any governmental subdivi-
sion thereof, or by his deputy or employee, in the performance of the
functions of his office shall be, so far as relevant, admitted in the courts
of this state as evidence of the matters stated therein, subject to the pro-
visions in Section 3.
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"Set. 2. Any written statement, certificate, record, return or report
made by an officer of the United States or of another state or nation, or
of any governmental subdivision of any of the foregoing, or by his
deputy or employee, in the performance of the functions of his office
shall, so far as relevant, be admitted in the courts of this state as prima
facie evidence of the matters stated 'therein, subject to the provisions
in Section 3.
"See. 3. Such writing shall be admissible only if the party offering it
has delivered a copy thereof, or so much of it as may relate to the con-
troversy, to the adverse party a reasonable time before trial, unless in
the opinion of the trial court the adverse party has not been unfairly
surprised by the failure to deliver such copy.
"See. 4. Such writings may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy. Except in the case of a copy of an official
writing from a public office of this state or a subdivision thereof, the
attestation shall be accompanied with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody of such writing. If the office in which the
record is kept is within the United States or within a territory or insular
possession subject to the dominion of the United States, the certificate
may be made by a judge of a court of record of the district or political
subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of
office and having official duties in the district or political subdivision
in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of his office. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign state or country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by an officer of a
United States military government, stationed in the foreign state or
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office.
"Sec. 5. A Written statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record, or by his deputy, that after diligent search no rec-
ord or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
"Sec. 6. This rule does not prevent the proof of official records or of
entry or lack of entry therein by any method authorized by any appli-
cable statute or by the rules of evidence at common law."
This statute introduces no new principles or theories concern-
ing the admissibility of evidence. The courts and legislators have
1951]
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long recognized that written statements, certificates, records, re-
turns and reports of public officials made in the course of their
official duties should be received as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Two reasons have dictated this result: (1) if public officials
were required to testify in person, much of their time would be
taken from the performance of their duties; (2) there is not the
same need for cross-examination because the official statements
made by a disinterested public official, usually under a duty he
has sworn to perform, are generally trustworthy. Furthermore, in
the usual case the records are subject to public inspection and
check, and there is little likelihood of error or falsification. Certi-
fied copies are permitted because the public business would be
seriously handicapped if the original records were tied up in
litigation.
The real need for the new statute is to afford a simple and uni-
form procedure for proving the content of public records. We
now have in our state government approximately 200 agencies,
departments and institutions administered by some 140 boards
or individuals. Most of these officials have special statutes provid-
ing that their official records, reports, returns, and certificates or
certified copies thereof are admissible in evidence as prima facie
proof of the matters therein stated. These numerous acts are scat-
tered throughout the civil statutes and have no semblance of uni-
formity. It is piecemeal legislation in the wildest form. The new
statute provides a single, simple procedure for making proof of
the contents of any statement, certificate, record, return or report
made by any state official in the performance of his duties. The
same procedure with an additional safeguard is applicable to
proof of records of the Federal Government or of another state
or nation. The adverse party is protected against surprise by the
provision for notice.
The first three sections of the statute provide for the admission
of the official records, etc., as prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein, subject to the provision for notice. These sections
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are based upon The Official Reports as Evidence Act drafted in
1936 by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Rules 515, 516 and 519 of the American Law Institute's
Model Code of Evidence, Sections 11 and 11b of the proposed
Missouri Evidence Code, and the simplified rule for official state-
ments set forth on page 745 of The Texas Law of Evidence (Mc-
Cormick and Ray). Section 4 deals with the manner in which the
proof shall be made, that is, authentication. This is done by an
official publication or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record. In case of copies of official writings from
public offices outside this state the attestation must be accompanied
by a certificate that the attesting officer has legal custody.
Under existing statutes very few state officials can certify that
the records of their office contain no specified record or entry.
Section 5 of the Act makes it possible to prove such fact by a
written statement signed by the officer having custody of the rec-
ord, accompanied by a certificate that such officer is the legal
custodian. Provision is made in Section 6 for the parties to resort
to other methods authorized by statute or common law rule. So
the new rule is not compulsory. Sections 4, 5 and 6 are taken
from Rules 44 (a), (b) and (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, covering the subject of certified and authenticated
copies. In 1938 the American Bar Association's Committee on
Improvement of the Law of Evidence, by a vote of 49 to 0, rec-
ommended the adoption by each state of Federal Rule 44 for
proof of records by certified copy.
THE SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT
This statute, which carries the title "Simultaneous Death-Dis-
position of Property," was Senate Bill No. 74, and was enacted
as Chapter 196 of the Laws of 1951, 52nd Legislature. It becomes




"Section 1. When the title to property or the devolution thereof
depends upon priority of death and there is no direct evidence that
persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, the property of each
person shall be disposed of as if he had survived, except as provided
otherwise in this Act.
"Sec. 2. When a husband and wife have died, leaving community
property and there is no direct evidence that they have died otherwise
than simultaneously, one-half of all community property shall be dis-
tributed as if the husband had survived and the other one-half thereof
shall be distributed as if the wife had survived, except as provided in
Section 5 hereof.
"Sec. 3. If property is so disposed of that the right of a beneficiary
to succeed to any interest therein is conditional upon his surviving
another person, and there is no direct evidence that the two have died
otherwise than simultaneously, the beneficiary shall be deemed not to
have survived. Provided, however, if any interest in property is given
alternately to one of two or more beneficiaries, with the right of each
to take being dependent upon his surviving the other or others, and all
shall die, and there is no direct evidence that they have died otherwise
than simultaneously, the property shall be divided into as many equal
portions as there are beneficiaries and those portions shall be distrib-
uted respectively to those who would have taken in the event that each
beneficiary had survived.
"Sec. 4. If any stocks, bonds, bank deposits, or other intangible prop-
erty shall be so owned that one of two joint owners is entitled to the
whole on the death of the other, and there is no direct evidence that the
joint owners shall have died otherwise than simultaneously, these assets
shall be distributed one-half as if one joint owner had survived and the
other one-half as if the other joint owner had survived. If there are
more than two joint owners and there is no direct evidence that all have
died otherwise than simultaneously, these assets shall be divided into
as many equal portions as there are joint owners and these portions
shall be distributed respectively to those who would have taken in the
event that each joint owner survived.
"Sec. 5. When the insured and the beneficiary in a policy of life or
accident insurance have died and there is no direct evidence that they
have died otherwise than simultaneously, the proceeds of the policy
shall be distributed as if the insured had survived the beneficiary.
"See. 6. This Act shall not apply to the distribution of the property
of a person who has died before it takes effect.
"Sec. 7. When provision has been made in the case of wills, living
[Vol. 5
THREE NEW RULES OF EVIDENCE
trusts, deeds, or contracts of insurance, or any other situation, for dis-
tribution of property different from the provisions of this Act, this Act
shall not apply."
At common law where two or more persons died in a common
disaster such as a wreck or fire, and the disposition of property
depended upon which of them survived, any person asserting a
right depending on survivorship had the burden of proving that
fact. The Texas courts have followed the common law in this re,
spect. When, as in most cases, no evidence of survivorship was
available, neither party could successfully prosecute a claim, and
the rights of interested persons could be determined only by nego-
tiation and settlement. For all practical purposes the courts were
closed to claimants in such cases. Legislation was needed to solve
this problem. The need is made more acute by the great increase
in simultaneous deaths brought about by the tremendous growth
in airplane travel and by higher automobile speeds. The civil law
system had developed a series of arbitrary presumptions of sur-
vivorship based on circumstances such as age, sex, and physical
condition which indicate a capacity to prolong life in a calamity.
These presumptions, which have been enacted by statute in a
number of states, have no statistical base and often operate to
defeat intentions. Texas has had no such statutes.
In 1940, after more than five years of study, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act and recommended it to the
states for adoption. By 1951 it had been adopted with various
modifications in some 37 states. Our Act is based on the Uniform
Act,' but there are some significant changes which will be men-
tioned later.
Simultaneous death is seldom within the contemplation of per-
sons who make provisions for the disposition of their property on
5 It is interesting to note that seven Acts, based in part at least on Acts drafted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, were passed by the
Fifty-second Legislature of Texas in 1951. Until this year only eight Uniform Acts had
been adopted in Texas.
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death, and of course many persons make no wills. The Act repre-
sents an attempt to protect the probable intention of owners of
property who have made no specific provisions for simultaneous
death. A person seldom desires to make provision for some one
else who dies at the same time he does. Furthermore, when two
persons perish at the same time, it is not likely that either would
wish the heir of the other to be preferred to his own heirs. So the
theory of the Act is that as to the property of each such person, he
is treated as having survived. In this way it is believed that his
property is most likely to go to the natural objects of his bounty.
These factors were given primary consideration in the drafting
of Sections 1, 2, 4 and 5. Section 2 of our Act is not in the Uni-
form Act. It covers the subject of community property specifically
and is taken from the Nevada statute which was enacted in 1949.
Section 3 of our Act represents a considerable departure from
the Uniform Act. The latter provides that where two or more bene-
ficiaries are to take successively by reason of survivorship, and
they die simultaneously, the property shall be divided equally
among the successive beneficiaries. This would seem to be justi-
fiable only when the probable intent of the grantor cannot be car-
ried out. Our Act provides for arbitrary division only in such
cases. When succession is conditioned on survivorship, the inten-
tion of the property owner is likely to be defeated if that condition
is ignored. So Section 3 provides in effect that an interest depend-
ent on survivorship is destroyed by simultaneous death.
The Act is to apply only in cases where the property owners
fail to provide for simultaneous deaths. Whenever a grantor or
donor of property indicates an intention in conflict with the pro-
vision of the Act, his expressed intention will be carried out. This
is specifically covered by Section 7 of the Act, which is taken
from the Uniform Act.
There is another respect in which the first five sections of the
Texas Act differ from the Uniform Act. Each of the sections ap.
plies only when there is no direct evidence that the persons have
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died other than simultaneously. The Uniform Act uses the phrase
"sufficient evidence," and this was the phrase used by the drafts-
man of the Texas Act. However, the Legislature saw fit to change
it to "direct evidence." This may cause difficulty in interpretation,
but I doubt that it will materially affect the application of the
statute.
EVIDENCE REFORM THROUGH LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Lawyers as a group may wonder why the Committee on Im-
provement of the Law of Evidence took their suggestions to the
Legislature rather than to the Supreme Court. This is a perfectly
reasonable inquiry and deserving of a frank answer. With refer-
ence to the Simultaneous Death Act, the Committee felt that since
it involved the disposition of property, it was within the jurisdic-
tion of the Legislature, and this Act was submitted to that body.
However, as to the other rules, the Committee was unanimously
of the opinion that Rules of Evidence should be promulgated by
the Supreme Court under its rule-making power. Since Evi-
dence is really only a part of trial procedure, it was believed
that there was no substantial doubt as to the Court's authority in
the premises. Furthermore, it has become increasingly clear that
if we are to have any real improvement in this field, it will have
to come from rules promulgated by the Court or enacted by the
Legislature. No substantial progress has resulted from piecemeal
appellate rulings on evidence points.
When the Business Records Rule was drafted, it was submitted
to the members of the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on
Civil Procedure and to the State Bar of Texas Committee on the
Administration of Justice. No substantial objection was made to
the proposed rule, and in fact most of the replies were outspokenly
favorable and expressed hope that the Court would adopt it. Copies
were then sent to the Supreme Court early in January with the
statement that the rule would be proposed to the Court for adop-
tion at its Spring meeting with the Advisory Committee on Rules
1951]
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of Civil Procedure. Within two weeks and without giving the
Evidence Committee a chance to be heard on the matter, the Court
summarily turned thumbs down on this rule as well as any other
Rules of Evidence. The two reasons assigned were that the Court
doubted its authority and did not deem it wise to enter the Evi-
dence field. While I do not propose to speak for the other members
of the Committee, in my own judgment this action of the Court
was an unfortunate abdication of judicial responsibility. I can-
not help but feel that a strong position in favor of making Rules
of Evidence would have added to the Court's stature, not only
with the bar but with the lay public.
With this abrupt rejection by the Court the Committee had no
other alternative than to seek improvement at the hands of the
Legislature. I am glad to state that we found the Senators and
Representatives ready and willing to listen to our proposals for
reform. We were received with great courtesy and respect by the
members of the Senate and House Committees, and many of them
worked tirelessly to pilot our bills through both houses after ap-
proval in the Committees. This experience has convinced me that
our legislators can be depended upon to enact rules for the im-
provement of the administration of justice once such rules are
properly presented to them and they are convinced of their merit.
Of course, difficulties are to be expected and congested calendars
to be reckoned with, but the results are more than worth the effort.
We have made a good start toward modernization of our rules of
Evidence. To my mind the path for further improvement is
through the legislative halls, and it is my hope that what has been
accomplished so far is only a beginning.
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